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Poremba: Urge to Reform Life Without Parole

URGE TO REFORM LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SO
NONVIOLENT
ADDICT OFFENDERS NEVER SERVE LIFETIME
BEHIND BARS
Johanna Poremba *
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the world shifts towards an abolition of capital punishment,
the United States remains the only western democratic state to employ
the death penalty during times of international peace. 1 Thirty states
currently sentence defendants to death, and states which have
abolished the policy utilize some form of life without the possibility of
parole. 2 This successor form of punishment was virtually nonexistent
until the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision, Furman v. Georgia, 3 which
temporarily abolished the death penalty. Since the reinstitution of the
death penalty, life without parole sentences have punished far more
people than first intended. 4 The long-term implications of this
sentence are only recently coming to light. 5 In particular, the effects
of this mode of punishment on juveniles and the mentally ill raise large

*Juris

Doctor Candidate 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Criminal Law
Concentration. Aspiring federal prosecutor seeking to shift America’s criminal justice system
to align with successful rehabilitative models seen in other countries. Thank you, Professor
Rena Seplowitz, for igniting the fire within me to publish my ideas; thank you to Steven Fink
and the Touro Law Review staff.
1 Kristi T. Prinzo, The United States—”Capital” of the World: An Analysis of Why the
United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International Trend is Towards Its
Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 855, 856 (1999).
2 State
by
State,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFORMATION
CENTER
(2019),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420 (1972).
4 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 11 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). Statistics will
be discussed later in this section.
5 Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implication for Post-Prison
Adjustment (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75001/Haney.pdf.
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concerns. 6 However, the effects on individuals addicted to drugs and
alcohol are absent from the discussion.
The Eighth Amendment shelters defendants from cruel and
unusual punishments.7 Past debates surrounding which forms of
punishment constitute “cruel and unusual” have focused around the
death penalty. 8 This Note will argue that life without parole for addict
prisoners is equally “cruel and unusual” and that rehabilitative
alternatives should be administered.
This Note will be divided into five sections. Section II will
discuss the American history that led nearly all states to embrace life
without parole and other pro-incarceration techniques as an alternative
to the death penalty. This section will reflect on the Supreme Court
cases that have guided state action in this area as well. Section III will
provide arguments against life without parole for addicts. This section
will be divided into three subsections. Subsection A will demonstrate
how the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution should be interpreted
to include a life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentence
for an addict as a “cruel and unusual” form of punishment. Subsection
B will address how an addicted brain is less culpable of criminal
conduct than a healthy brain. Subsection C will disprove the common
arguments supporting incarcerating addicts for life. Section IV will
propose changes that should occur within our judicial system to ensure
that sick, addicted, and diseased persons will receive the treatment they
require instead of an extended death sentence. This section will also
call on prosecutors—whose power to shape the system is arguably as
great as lawmakers themselves—to act to eliminate these sentences.
Finally, Section V will recommend the implementation of three steps
to ensure that change will occur..
II.

HISTORY

State statutes LWOP practices date back as early as 1841. 9 The
most significant increase in life sentences of this nature began in the
Id. at IIIA.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8 Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 39, 40 (2018).
9 Year That States Adopted Life Without Parole (LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER (2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-withoutparole-lwop-sentencing.
6
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mid-1970s and grew through the 1990s after lawmakers responded to
an increase in drug abuse and related crime with the War on Drugs. 10
President Nixon and his administration sparked the beginning of a
multi-decade long effort to combat drug abuse as “public enemy
number one.” 11 The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 created a
single all-inclusive statutory scheme criminalizing the possession,
distribution, and manufacture of all drugs for recreational use. 12
Nixon’s policy reforms did more than criminalize drugs; the national
undertaking allocated $105 million of the appropriated $155 million to
treatment and rehabilitation efforts. 13 Unfortunately, by the 1980s,
during Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Congress slashed the funding for
these treatment programs to less than one-fourth of those original
reserves. 14 In 1984, Congress introduced new mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses, and just four years later, expanded these
laws to include attempts and conspiracies. 15 These decisions would
have profound long-term effects on the federal prison population by
putting those involved at even the lowest level (lookout, couriers, street
dealers) at risk of lifelong federal imprisonment. 16 Although
government efforts to label drugs as public enemy number one fell to
the background of the political sphere through the 1990s and 2000s,
the anti-drug movement already tainted the beliefs of many Americans.
Currently, nearly all states, including New York, Florida,
California, and Texas,implement some form of this lifelong
punishment. 17 Each of these jurisdictions sentences individuals to life
with parole, life without parole, and “virtual life” sentences. 18
However, sentences including LWOP have been administered
JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 33 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013).
11 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 1329 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013).
12 Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 1323, 1330 (2016).
13 Kreit, supra note 12, at 1329.
14 Id. at 1332.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 ASHLEY NELLIS, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM
SENTENCES 10 (The Sentencing Project, 2017).
18 Id. Virtual life (or de facto life sentences) are sentences not statutorily defined as a “life
sentence,” yet the term of imprisonment is so long that the prisoner is unlikely to survive if
carried out in full. Researchers estimate a sentence of 50 or more years falls under this third,
virtual life category. It is difficult to define virtual life sentences because a prisoner’s age at
the time of imprisonment is a key factor in the calculation.
10
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disproportionately across the country. 19 As of 2016, 53,290 inmates
were serving LWOP sentences, which equates to one out of every
twenty-eight inmates. 20 However, just over half of this group consists
of inmates from a handful of states, including Florida, Pennsylvania,
California, and Louisiana, as well as the federal system. 21 Of the
prisoners serving LWOP for nonviolent offenses nationwide, 79%,
approximately 2,577 inmates, are incarcerated for drug offenses. 22
That number for federal inmates is 1,989, or 96% of prisoners with
LWOP sentences. 23
The term “nonviolent” is somewhat misleading due to its
varying interpretation among the states. 24 While the expression
“violent” is often interpreted by the public as synonymous with murder
or rape, some jurisdictions include the following in this category:
manufacture or sale of a controlled substance, extortion, burglary, and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 25 Thus, many drugaddicted prisoners may, in fact, be labeled as violent for crimes
committed in furtherance of their habits.
Shifting this country’s “tough on crime” mindset to one of
understanding and rehabilitation would ameliorate the drug problem
and produce benefits for addicts and society. It is not “tough” to
imprison diseased people who need help, especially those who have
aged past their years of a proclivity for lawbreaking. Quite to the
contrary, it wastes vital taxpayer resources that could be utilized for
crime prevention and rehabilitative measures. For our nation to
progress, we must first look back in time at how our justice system has
dealt with issues regarding lifelong punishments.
Rather than apply an evenhanded system of review for
noncapital offenses, the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress’s and
state legislatures’ decisions regarding LWOP sentencing. 26 The first
major example of this laissez-faire approach can be seen in Rummel v.
Nellis, supra note 17 at 10.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Dana
Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime#.jVkAeF0cA
(Mar. 20, 2015).
23 Id.
24 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 18 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013).
25 Id.
26 Turner, supra note 24 at 207.
19
20
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Estelle. 27 In this 1980 case, the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory
life sentence of a nonviolent Texan man. 28 The three felonies leading
to his statutorily required sentence included: fraudulent use of a credit
card to obtain $80, forging a check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses. 29 Under his sentence, Rummel would be eligible
for parole after 10 to 12 years. 30
The defense argued that Rummel’s life sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his nonviolent offenses, thus violating the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 31 In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the Texas recidivist law did not violate
the Eighth Amendment because states have a significant interest in
sentencing repeat criminals incapable of conforming to societal norms
more harshly. 32 The Court bluntly noted that outside the context of
capital punishment, challenges to the proportionality of sentences are
rarely successful. 33 Albeit, just three years later, a new case discounted
this statement when the Court confronted the issue of lifetime
imprisonment without any possibility of parole. 34
In 1983, the Supreme Court made a decision that revealed the
panel’s distaste for life sentences without the possibility of parole for
nonviolent crimes. 35 Thirty-six-year-old Jerry Helm was convicted in
a South Dakota state court for writing a “no account” check for one
hundred dollars. 36 The usual punishment for such a crime under state
law was five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 37 However,
because the defendant had six prior nonviolent felony convictions,
South Dakota’s recidivist statute required an LWOP sentence. 38
Helm’s prior crimes included: three, third-degree burglaries, obtaining
money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving while
intoxicated. 39 The Court acknowledged that Helm never committed a
27 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980). The Supreme Court’s language shows
much deference to the state – “Texas is entitled to make its own judgment.”
28 Id.
29 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263-66 (1980).
30 Id. at 265.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 271.
34 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 278.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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single crime against another human being. 40 Notably, the Court also
recognized Helm’s addiction to alcohol as a contributing factor in each
case. 41 This key factor of addiction was not present in Rummel.
The Court came to its decision by noting that nonviolent crimes
are less serious than violent crimes against persons and that sentences
may be unconstitutional on excessive length alone. 42 The majority
applied a three-prong proportionality analysis of the Eighth
Amendment to reach its decision, considering:
(1) The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty. (2) The sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction. (Whether more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties. (3) The sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 43
The decision stated that the death penalty is different from
other punishments, not in degree but in kind. 44 What the Court meant
is that those sentenced to LWOP suffer the same degree of damage as
death row inmates, even though the “kind” of punishment differs. 45
The Supreme Court held that Helm’s sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment as disproportionate to his crime. 46 Incarcerating a man of
his nature for life without the possibility of parole is unlikely to
advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial
way. 47 Neither the addicted defendant nor the State will have the
incentive to rehabilitate this individual as he so desperately needed.
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court spoke again on the issue
of lifelong imprisonment, this time dealing with California’s hotly
contested “3 Strikes” rule. 48 Plainly stated, the state enacted this
extreme legislation in 1994 to ensure longer prison sentences and
greater punishment for prior felons. 49 The law applies to any defendant

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983).
42 Id. at 278.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 294.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 303.
47 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 n.22 (1983).
48 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
49 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 403-15 (1997).
40
41
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convicted of three serious felonies. 50 Under the statute, the felonies
are not required to be committed consecutively or within a certain time
period, and the time between offenses does not affect the imposition of
the sentence. 51 On the third felony, or “strike,” the law withdraws the
court’s discretion to commit the defendant to a diversion program or
rehabilitation center. 52 Conversely, the individual is often placed
behind bars permanently, without any possibility of parole. 53 The
statute provides that the defendant’s minimum sentence will be the
greater of three times the term of imprisonment for each current felony,
twenty-five years, or a term determined by application of the
California penal code plus other enhancement provisions. 54 The reality
behind this language is that the best outcome a three-strikes defendant
can hope for is twenty years in prison. 55 The law’s promises to reduce
crime and diminish the financial burden on society have been called
into question by critics. 56
The Supreme Court acknowledged this debate nine years after
the harsh law took effect in the case of Ewing v. California.57 Yet, the
holding of the case was not a win for opponents of the legislation.
Ewing was convicted of a felony grand theft for stealing three golf
clubs, each worth $399. 58 Pursuant to California law, the court
sentenced Ewing to a mandated life sentence. 59 The state had
previously convicted Ewing of four serious or violent felonies,
including three separate burglaries, only one of which was an armed
offense. 60 The Court held that California’s Three Strikes Law does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 61 Therefore, Ewing’s sentence

50 Id. at 403. In 2012, Proposition 36 would alter what “kinds” of felonies could be
considered. This will be discussed at length in section IV(b).
51 Id. at 404.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 401.
54 Id. at 407.
55 Vitiello, supra note 49 at 407.
56 Id. at 422-37. Vitiello shows how the analysis used to estimate savings to society is
flawed; Ewing 538 U.S. at 27.
57 Supra note 48.
58 Id. at 13.
59 Id. at 18-20.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 29.
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of twenty-five years to life in prison was not grossly disproportionate
to his combined felonies of grand theft and three separate burglaries. 62
The dissent compared Ewing’s case to Rummel and Solem to
consider how the Court reached differing outcomes in each
circumstance. 63 Ewing’s claim fell somewhere between the Rummel
and Solem logic. 64 Ewing’s claim was stronger than the claim
presented in Rummel, where the court upheld a recidivist’s 25 years to
life sentence as constitutional. 65 Yet, it was weaker than the claim in
Solem, where the Court struck down a recidivist sentence as
unconstitutional. 66 The reasons relate to the the differing outcomes of
each conviction. By looking at the three pertinent comparative factors
in each case, it becomes clear why the seemingly similar cases were
handled differently. The first factor, prior record or offender
characteristics, remained somewhat equal among all three cases.
Ewing’s prior record was not much different from Helm’s or
Rummel’s; four prior felonies as compared to Helm’s six and
Rummel’s three. The second factor, offense conduct, was also fairly
similar because both offenses included a low monetary loss. However,
the last factor, length of likely prison term, varied. While the defendant
in Rummel had the possibility of parole ten to twelve years after his
sentence began, Helm did not have this benefit and faced a lifetime
behind bars. Ewing’s prison term was more than twice as long as the
term at issue in Rummel. The Court admitted that Ewing, seriously ill
when sentenced at 38, would likely die in prison. Ewing was classified
as a property offender in the case and not a drug user, even though
Ewing’s former charges included possessing drug paraphernalia. 67
In each case, the defendant’s mental health status was nearly
absent from the discussion. There was no discussion of LWOP
sentencing practices’ effects on adult drug addicts. However, success
in the movement to eliminate LWOP has been found for juveniles.68
In Graham v. Florida, the Court openly noted that a life sentence alters
the offender’s life irrevocably by depriving the defendant of the most

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. at 34.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
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basic liberties without hope of restoration. 69 In this case, the Florida
court sentenced seventeen-year-old Graham to life behind bars. 70 A
year prior to his sentence, Graham was charged with two serious
felonies: armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed
robbery. 71 After taking a plea deal and serving twelve months in
county jail, Graham was released on parole, only to be again arrested
for armed home robbery six months later. 72 The trial court held a
sentencing hearing at which it found that Graham was guilty of the
charges and no longer capable of rehabilitation. 73 Thus, Graham was
given the maximum sentence authorized: life imprisonment without
the possibility of release. 74
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed this decision on the
ground that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishments. Although the justices briefly mentioned
Graham’s upbringing by two crack-addicted parents, his alcohol
consumption, and tobacco use by age nine and marijuana use by age
thirteen, the Court did not rely on these factors as much as Graham’s
youth at the time of sentencing. 75 Ultimately, the Court scrutinized the
categorical practice of lifelong sentences for juveniles. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy stated that LWOP, “gives no chance for
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with
society, no hope.” 76 The Justice highlighted that the United States is
the only nation that imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile
nonhomicide offenders. 77
If the Court was willing to compare punishment strategies to
the rest of the world in reviewing our treatment of juveniles in the
justice system, it would help us understand the morality of LWOP
sentences on addicted persons. Similarly, our country needs to
consider the implications that these living death sentences have on
Id. at 70.
Id. at 52-53.
71 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 54 (2010). It is important to note here that Florida law
gave the District Attorney’s office the discretion whether to charge sixteen and seventeenyear-olds as adults or minors for most felonies. Graham’s prosecutor chose to charge Graham
as an adult.
72 Id.
73 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 58.
74 Id.
75 Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.
76 Id. at 79.
77 Id. at 81.
69
70

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [2020], Art. 7

1240

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

addicts and their families. If the Supreme Court scrutinizes the
categorical practice of lifelong sentences for addicts in the same way
it has scrutinized this sentence for youthful offenders, it could
eliminate this elongated death sentence for addicts in need of
rehabilitation.
III.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST LWOP

Many who argue against the death penalty cite LWOP as the
answer to our nation’s recidivism concerns. 78 While some accept this
blanket solution, the realities behind this punishment are far from
positive. 79 : Both the Constitution and scientific evidence support the
idea that a punishment of life behind bars for those with substance
abuse issues is immoral and unjust.
A.

LIFE SENTENCES FOR ADDICT PRISONERS
VIOLATES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT

In determining whether any form of punishment is
constitutional, we look to the language and interpretations of the
Eighth Amendment. Before Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court
adamantly followed the notion that “death is different” from any other
type of sentence, 80 finding the acceptable outer constitutional limits of
capital punishment stemmed from the evolving standards of decency
test. 81 Conversely, determining acceptable punishment in non-capital
cases was determined by a vague and narrow proportionality
principle. 82 Here, courts were to consider all circumstances of the case
19 UPAJLSC 185, 186, Into the Abyss: The Unintended Consequences of Death Penalty
Abolition.
79 19 UPAJLSC 185, 186, LWOP inmates “are not afforded the same heightened due
process protections afforded to those on death row by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of
death…. They have less access to the courts and less ability to challenge the accuracy or
legality of their convictions and are therefore in a worse position than those who have been
sentenced to death.”
80 William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death, 71 OH. S. L.
J. 1109, 1111 (2010).
81 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972). The evolving standards of decency test
must “mark the progress of a maturing society.”
82 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78
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in deciding whether the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive. 83
Due to a lack of a clear or consistent interpretation of this standard
(besides clearly grossly disproportionate sentences), courts obtained
little guidance in determining whether a life sentence without parole
fit a particular crime. 84 However, in Graham, the Court strayed from
the “death is different” ideology and applied the same level of scrutiny
to LWOP as in capital cases. 85 In doing so, the Court blurred the line
between capital and non-capital cases for the first time, suggesting that
a new category had evolved somewhere in the middle. 86 LWOP
sentences now require the higher level scrutiny standard, which is
measured by the evolving standards of decency test. 87
Before the Graham decision, the Court implied this standard in
Solem v. Helm to find that a life sentence for a nonviolent crime
violated the Eighth Amendment. 88 However, this case acted as an
exception rather than the standard. 89 Looking even further back in
time, we can catch a glimpse of how the Court viewed the Eighth
Amendment as applied to drug addicts.
In 1962, the Supreme Court held that it is cruel and unusual to
impose even one day of imprisonment for the status of drug
addiction. 90 In Robinson v. California, a California statute made it a
crime for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics. 91 The state
convicted Robinson based solely on the fact that scarring on his arms
evidenced a past of needle-injecting drug use. 92 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reasoned that to imprison a person merely for his
status, even though he never touched a narcotic drug nor found guilty
of any irregular behavior in the state, is unconstitutional. 93 In essence,
treating drug addicts like criminals is cruel and unusual punishment

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. at 58.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97.
85 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S at 61-62.
86 Supra note 80.
87 Id. at 1123.
88 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
89 Supra note 80 at 1119. As previously mentioned, Solem established a three factor
proportionality analysis: The gravity of the offense versus the harshness of the penalty,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties, and
how other jurisdictions penalize the crime.
90 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
91 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660.
92 Id. at 687 and n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
93 Supra note 90.
83
84
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under the Eighth Amendment. 94 This is because narcotics addiction
can be contracted innocently or involuntarily. 95
However, by 1990, the Court, in Harmelin v. Michigan, ruled
that a life sentence for a single possession of cocaine was not cruel and
unusual punishment. 96 The defendant in Harmelin was convicted of
possessing 672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term
of life in prison without possibility of parole. 97 Defense counsel
argued that the defendant’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
because of its significant disproportionality to the crime. 98 Further, the
defendant's lack of any prior felonies was irrelevant under Michigan
law, which mandated his life sentence. 99
The Court rejected the defendant’s constitutional claim and
went on to answer the question of whether the Eighth Amendment
contains a sentence proportionality guarantee. 100 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that the framers intended the Eighth
Amendment as a check on the ability of the legislature to authorize
particular modes of punishment, rather than as a guarantee against
disproportionate sentences. 101 Thus, the Eighth Amendment does not
contain a proportionality guarantee that the Court found during the
Solem case just seven years ago. 102 The Court reasoned that in Solem,
the majority misinterpreted the framers' intent. 103
While a
disproportionate punishment can always be deemed cruel, it will not
always be unusual. 104 In ruling that cruel and unusual does not include
a proportionality principle, the Court rejected the three-factor analysis

94 Id. at 668-76 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Justice noted that England treats addicts as
sick people and not criminals as the United States does. He commented that although this fact
alone does not make California’s penal law unconstitutional, we must acknowledge the group
of drug addicts who have “lost their power of self-control.” He stated that “cruel and unusual
punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime.”
95 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
96 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991).
97 Id. at 961.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 994.
100 Id. at 965.
101 Id. at 960.
102 Id. at 965.
103 Id. at 966.
104 Id. at 967.
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from Solem. 105 Although the Court upheld the Michigan statute, it
surmised that reasonable minds may differ about its effectiveness. 106
The dissent adamantly stated that there can be no doubt that
prior decisions of the Court had construed cruel and unusual to include
a proportionality principle. 107 The dissent also cited Robinson, noting
that the ripple effect on society caused by drugs (crimes stemming
from drug deals, health problems, lost productivity) is not the direct
consequence of possession, but of the resulting addiction. 108
The Court did not, however, recognize that drug addictions are
perpetuated by the justice system’s recycling of addicts rather than
properly rehabilitating them. 109 Criminalizing individuals who possess
drugs for personal use is the same as criminalizing a status. Similarly,
it is cruel and unusual to put diseased people who need rehabilitation
behind bars for life. These propositions become clear by taking a
closer look at the criminal culpability of an addicted individual.
B.

AN ADDICT BRAIN IS LESS CULPABLE

The first concept taught in many criminal law classes is that a
crime requires both a voluntary act, or actus reus, and a culpable
mental state, or mens rea. 110 When a defendant is found guilty of a
crime, the verdict essentially means that the defendant intended the
result to occur. The justice system asks whether the crime was
committed by the individual, not whether the crime was committed in
furtherance of an addiction. While a defense of voluntary alcohol or

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
Id. at 1009.
107 Id. at 1012.
108 Id. at 1022.
109 Christine Minhee & Steve Calandrillo, The Cure for America’s Opioid Crisis? End the
War on Drugs, 42 HARV. JUR. L. PP. 547, 497 (2019). The authors argue that the disparity
between how Americans view cocaine and heroin addiction as opposed to morphine,
OxyContin or other prescription drug addiction creates a bifurcated view of addiction. By
criminalizing the former and treating the latter, the policy response in effect is to deprioritize
rehabilitation for those addicted to the “criminal” drugs.
110 Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Choice and Criminal Law (2017). Faculty Scholarship,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2609&context=faculty_schola
rship. Actus reus is the legally wrongful act that must be proved that the defendant committed
either voluntarily or intentionally. Mens rea refers to the mindset or degree of mental
culpability which a defendant must have. These include knowing, negligent, intentional,
deliberate. A defendant must have both an actus reus and mens rea, along with any other
relevant elements of a crime in order to be found guilty.
105
106
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drug intoxication is available for criminal defendants, this defense
cannot be claimed for a mere drug possession charge. 111
Yet, the link between drug use and crime is no secret. Drug
users have consistently been found to participate in risky behavior
overall. 112 The word “addiction” is derived from a Latin term meaning
“enslaved by” or “bound to.” 113 This makes sense, because addiction
fundamentally changes the reward system in the brain, making addicts
literally slaves to their addiction. 114 The individual no longer responds
to the threat of punishment in the same way as a sober individual.115
This explains why the threat of a judicial sentence has not and will not
stop drug users from taking drugs and selling drugs to fuel their
addiction. 116
The United States Congress determines criminal sentencing
recommendations using four rationales for guidance: deterrence,
retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 117 Prior to 1983, the
Court compared punishment and defendant culpability to determine if
a sentence “fit” the given crime. 118 The United States followed this
technique as precedent up until 1991, when the majority in the
Harmelin Court claimed they got it wrong in Solem, stating that the
Eighth Amendment is a “check on the ability of the Legislature to
authorize particular modes of punishment…rather than a guarantee
against disproportionate sentences.” 119 In the concurrence, Justice
Kennedy argued that legislatures should be free to choose from any of
the four major rationales listed above in determining proper
punishment for a given crime and that the weight given to each
principle varies with time. 120

State v. Garcia, 784 P.2d 297, 300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
Y. Saadatmand, M. Toma, & J. Choquette (2012). The War on Drugs and Crime
Rates. Journal of Business & Economics, 10(5), 285-90.
113 How Addiction Hijacks the Brain, HARVARD HEALTH PUBLISHING (July 2011),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/how-addiction-hijacks-the-brain.
114 Priya Shetty, Law and Order: Blame it on the Brain, BBC FUTURE (July 11, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120710-blame-it-on-the-brain.
115 Id.
116 Id. Nora Volkow, the director of the Institute on Drug Abuse at the National Institutes
of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, draws this conclusion.
117 John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
653, 717-20 (2012).
118 Supra note 43.
119 Supra note 96 at 960.
120 Id. at 999.
111
112
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Perhaps these four penological goals vary depending on the
current views that America’s general population takes. In 2018, a
survey of over one thousand people showed that although 53% viewed
prescription drug dependency as a medical issue, fewer than 20% of
those surveyed would be “willing to associate closely with someone
who is addicted to prescription drugs as a friend, colleague or
neighbor.” 121 The stigma behind addiction still thrives within our
borders. As more research on narcotics’ effects on the brain comes to
light, the understanding of the country should grow and these instilled
cultural beliefs will change.
Just twenty years ago, our country and courts believed the
execution of the mentally retarded met constitutional standards. In
1989, when first confronted with the issue of whether execution of the
mentally retarded is constitutional, the Supreme Court found
“insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded people.” 122 During this time, only two states and the
Federal Government prohibited execution of the mentally retarded,
albeit allowing executions in general. 123
However, by 2002, the Court’s mindset shifted in Atkins v.
Virginia. 124 The Court found that “much ha[d] changed” in thirteen
years in that the practice had become “truly unusual.” 125 The reason
behind this change of heart became evident when the decision stated
that it was “fair to say that a national consensus had developed against
it [execution of the mentally retarded].” By this time, sixteen
additional states prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded, and
no states had reinstated the power. The Atkins Court highlighted how
the backbone of the decision rested on “not so much the number” of
states that had acted, but instead “the consistency of the direction of
change.” 126 Further, the Court explained that executing mentally
retarded individuals would not serve the interests of deterrence or
121 Beth Leipholtz, Poll: Most Americans View Addiction As Disease, But Stigmatizing
Views Persist, THE FIX, (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.thefix.com/poll-most-americans-viewaddiction-disease-stigmatizing-views-persist.
122 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
123 Cruel and Unusual Punishments, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusualpunishments.
124 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
125 Id. at 316.
126 Id. at 315. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). This case would solidify the ideas set
forth in Atkins.
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retribution due to the lack of developmental capacities necessary to
establish a threshold level of culpability. 127
Over time, our nation has come to accept the concept of
lessened culpability of the mentally ill. After that, our nation came to
accept that adolescences too lack cognitive decision-making skills. It
is only a matter of time before this nation shifts to understanding
addicted individuals’ lessened culpability. Although it may seem
radical now, as we collectively understand an addiction’s role on the
brain and cognitive decision making, it is likely that the justice system
will find more leniency and acceptance in pushing for rehabilitative
measures as opposed to choosing LWOP for nonviolent addicts.
C.

REFUTING ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT
LWOP FOR ADDICTS

Proponents of the War on Drugs and its aftermath believe
incarceration is the answer to America’s drug problem. Some common
arguments made by these believers include: 1) the cost of rehabilitation
is greater than incarceration, and 2) prison inmates are impossible to
cure with treatment, making rehabilitation a waste of resources. 128
Similarly, one could argue that allowing rehabilitation for criminals
could create a slippery slope that would allow more and more criminals
to claim to have a “drug problem” in order to evade the criminal justice
system.
Across America, prison costs continue to rise alongside the
ever-growing prison population. 129 According to the Federal Register,
the national average cost to confine one prison inmate is $34,704.12
per year. 130 For elderly prisoners, that price tag climbs to anywhere

127 Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a
Categorical Exemption for Juveniles From Capital Punishment, 33 N. M. L. REV. 207, 207
(2003).
128 Alan I. Leshner, TREATMENT OPTION FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IS CONSISTENT
WITH RESEACH FINDINGS, 72 SEP N.Y. St. B.J. 53, 54 (2000).
129 U.S. v. Leitch, 2013 WL 753445 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) “Everywhere you look
federal policy makers are complaining about the rising costs of incarceration….Despite a
sustained increase in federal prison spending, the continued growth of the prison population
has resulted in overcrowding.”
130 Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, FEDERAL REGISTER, (Apr. 30,
2018),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/04/30/2018-09062/annualdetermination-of-average-cost-of-incarceration.
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from sixty to seventy-thousand dollars per year. 131 While it would be
incorrect to say all drug treatment programs are less expensive and
naïve to claim any two rehabilitative services are built the same, there
are undoubtedly cheaper available options. Over 3,000 drug courts
already exist across the country, their goal being to route addicted
criminals to appropriate treatment rather than incarceration.132
Nationally, the average drug court program cost ranges between $900
to $2,200 per defendant. 133 This is a small price to pay in order to
allocate more effectively valuable criminal justice resources. 134
One may further argue that prisons already offer enough
services for addicted prisoners. In fact, The New York Times revealed
in 2017 that fewer than 30 prisons across the country offer medications
that combat opioid addiction—methadone or buprenorphine. 135 The
reality is that the services available are scarce and insufficient to
provide necessary change. Ultimately, the cost of one successful drug
treatment is far less than cycling an addict in and out of prison for life.
As for treatability, many citizens wrongfully believe that prison
inmates are poor candidates for treatment. 136 This mistaken belief
stems from the longstanding view that addicts, especially those behind
bars, are weak or powerless to better themselves. 137 However,
according to the director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse,
scientific research shows that when the legal system pressures an
individual to pursue treatment as an alternative to incarceration, the
likelihood of success in drug treatment actually improves. 138 This
body of research, spanning twenty years in length, shows consistently
high returns for society when drug treatment is used for addicted
131 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 194 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). Inmates over
age 50 tend to require increased healthcare and staff personnel, which in turn demands
increased costs for the prison.
132 Drug
Courts,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE
(2018),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf. See also Lisa N. Sacco, Federal Support for
Drug Courts: In Brief, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44467.pdf.
133 Benefits
of
Drug
Court,
SANMATEO
COURT,
(2019),
https://www.sanmateocourt.org/court_divisions/criminal/drug_court/benefits.php.
134 Id.
135 Matt
Gonzales,
Prisoners
and
Addiction,
DRUGREHAB.COM
(2019),
https://www.drugrehab.com/addiction/prisoners/.
136 Leshner, Alan I, TREATMENT OPTION FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IS CONSISTENT
WITH RESEACH FINDINGS, 72 SEP N.Y. St. B.J. 53, 54 (2000).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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criminals. 139 Further, these individuals are proven to use fifty to
seventy percent fewer drugs than those who go untreated, and fifty to
sixty percent less likely to be incarcerated again. 140
The solution to the slippery slope concern requires drawing a
line at nonviolent offenses that are direct consequences of addiction.
Drug possession, minor drug sales, or stealing to promote a habit (if
clear evidence of addiction exists) would all fit under this category.
Criminals with violent offenses on their record within the last five
years should not be able to claim they have a drug problem absent some
other extenuating circumstances. A defendant would have to be
evaluated on a case by case basis by a professional in the field to
determine eligibility for rehabilitation.
Ultimately, the four policy rationales are not served by
imprisoning nonviolent addicts for life. Retribution for a nonviolent
addict does not demand a LWOP sentence. 141 Deterrence becomes
marginal, and most importantly, the possibility of rehabilitation
becomes unattainable. 142
IV.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
“If lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for
nonviolent drug addicts actually worked, one might be
able to rationalize them. But there is no evidence that
they do. I have seen how they leave hundreds of
thousands of young children parentless and thousands
of aging, infirm, and dying parents childless. They
destroy families and mightily fuel the cycle of poverty
and addiction. . . .” 143

139

Id.
Id.
141 Berry, supra note 80 at 1143.
142 Id.
143 Judge Mark W. Bennett, How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send More Than
1,000 Nonviolent Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, THE NATION (2012 Issue),
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-mandatory-minimums-forced-me-send-more-1000nonviolent-drug-offenders-federal-pri/.
140
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NEW SYSTEM OF REVIEW FOR LWOP CASES

The Supreme Court has historically relied on Congress and the
states in deciding how to handle LWOP cases. In order to eliminate
any possibility of non-violent, addict offenders serving life sentences,
either the Supreme Court or Congress must act. The Court must hear
a case on this narrow issue in order to proclaim a proper system of
review—a process that could take decades. Thus, Congress and our
state legislatures should establish a new system of review for LWOP
cases to ensure the speediest result.
Compared to the rest of the world, America’s progress is
lagging in the area of forward-thinking justice. Nearly one-hundred
other countries signed onto the Rome Statute wherein Article 110(3)
requires all life sentences to be reviewed after twenty-five years.144
Various European countries have abolished LWOP altogether while
some countries do not even include the term “life imprisonment”
within statutory language. 145 On an international level, courts consider
the release of LWOP prisoners in several European, African, Central
Asian and South American countries. 146 Upon release, these countries'
standards focus on assisting prisoners to re-enter communities.147
However, common conditions include regularized supervision, also
known as a conditional release. 148 These conditions may include
regular supervision attendance, approved residence, home visits by a
supervising officer, approved employment, travel restrictions, drug
testing, and travel and behavior restrictions. 149 Sixty-eight of the
seventy-nine countries that allow for release of life-sentenced
prisoners also contend that violation of a conditional release will result
in “recall to prison.” 150 This means exactly what it sounds like: an
individual recently released from LWOP may be returned to prison for
144 JENNIFER TURNER ET AL., A LIVING DEATH—LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT
OFFENSES 200 (Vanita Gupta et al. eds., American Civil Liberties Union, 2013). See Professor
Dirk Van Zyl Smith & Dr. Catherine Appleton, A Life Imprisonment, A Policy Briefing, PENAL
REFORM
INTERNATIONAL
(2018)
https://cdn.penalreform.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/PRI_Life-Imprisonment-Briefing.pdf.
145 Id.
146 Smith, supra note 144. It is worth noting that the methods of release vary within each
country. Determinants of a prisoner’s release vary from: a court, parole board, executive
politician, or governor or minister granting clemency.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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committing an offense or violating parole conditions. 151 Studies reveal
that recidivism and re-arrest rates among released life-sentenced
prisoners are low compared to other released prisoners. 152 The key to
successful reintegration into community life requires community
programs and supervision in the community. 153
While America may not be actively participating in this
international shift, some American states have recognized the need for
change due to overcrowding within their state prison walls.154
Oklahoma’s “Parole of Aging Prisoners Act” purports to ease prison
overcrowding by creating a flexible geriatric release system. 155 The
state bill gives the parole board power to grant parole to a prisoner who
is at least 50 years old and has served at least 10 years or one-third of
his prison term. 156 Eligible prisoners may request to appear before the
parole board on the next available docket. 157 However, because the
bill excludes twenty-two crimes, including murder, arson, first-degree
burglary, aggravated robbery, and any crime that would result in sex
offender registration upon release, individuals serving life will not
qualify. 158 In fact, analysis of data from the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections reveals that only one-quarter of the prisoners who are age
fifty or above become eligible for parole under this law. 159 Oklahoma
151

Id.
Brandon L Garrett, The Moral Problem of Life-Without Parole, TIME (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://time.com/4998858/death-penalty-life-without-parole/. According to a 2013 California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation report, recidivism rates among LWOP prisoners
who have been granted parole by the governor are extremely low, “markedly” less than those
of other released prisoners. See also Christopher Zoukis, California Lifers Paroled in Record
LEGAL
NEWS
(Mar.
31,
2016),
Numbers,
PRISON
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/mar/31/california-lifers-paroled-recordnumbers/.
153 Life Imprisonment, A Policy Briefing, PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 2018),
https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PRI_Life-ImprisonmentBriefing.pdf.
154 Nicole D. Porter, Testimony to the NY Joint Leg. Budget Hearing on Public Protection,
SENTENCING
PROJECT
(2019),
THE
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_the_sentencing_project.pd
f. Of course, states have humanitarian concerns such as public safety and wellbeing. However,
overcrowding has provided a neutral means of addressing the issue of mass incarceration for
the states.
155 Id. See 57 Okl.St.Ann. § 332.21 (2018).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 ASHLEY NELLIS, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM
SENTENCES 6 (The Sentencing Project, 2017).
152
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would be better served by amending this legislation to allow prisoners
who are free of such violent offenses for five years to be eligible under
the statute.
A wiser alternative is to enact an “intermediate” proportionality
standard of review for LWOP cases. 160 This proposition would fall
somewhere between the evolving standards of decency used in capital
cases and the narrow proportionality principle used in non-capital
cases. 161 The heightened standard would ensure greater safeguards
against error by forcing excessive review on a case by case basis. In
order to show an LWOP sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, the
defendant must demonstrate that the sentence was excessive in
duration as compared to the offenses. 162 Also included in this method
of review would be a mandatory LWOP case review every twenty-five
years.
Although the majority in Graham applied the evolving
standards of decency to LWOP sentences, the dissent in Graham
stressed that such an application departs from the Court’s prior
precedent. Thus, the best solution is to apply a new, unique standard.
LWOP falls between a death sentence and a standard prison term, a
fact that has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court Justices.163
Both death and LWOP share the characteristic of irrevocability, and
for that reason, when it comes to nonviolent addicts in need of help,
there must be a new process to review such cases. Such a new process
of review will ultimately lead to releases of individuals from life
imprisonment sentences, at which point, it will be proper to analyze
successful models of release from overseas. Until then, there are steps
to be taken within our own borders to halt the number of addicted men
and women serving life behind bars.

Berry, supra note 80 at 1141.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. The Supreme Court implied in Graham that LWOP is
somewhere between death and a non-capital sentence, since freedom thereafter is essentially
“irredeemable” and it simultaneously forecloses the possibility of ever reviewing that
determination.
162 Berry, supra note 80 at 1142.
163 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (noting that “life without parole is “the second most severe
penalty permitted by law.” It is true that a death sentence is “unique in its severity and
irrevocability”; yet life-without-parole sentences share some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.).
160
161
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REFORM 3 STRIKES, PROSECUTOR
EDUCATION, & MORE REHABILITATIVE
OPTIONS

Nearly half of the states follow some form of two, three, or four
strikes approach. 164 Since the enactment of California’s Three-Strike
Law, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000
(“Proposition 36”) has been introduced in an effort to undo the wrongs
of Three-Strikes. 165 Yet, critics question the impartiality of California
courts and prosecutors in administering Proposition 36. 166 The law
applies to any “qualifying conviction for nonviolent drug possession,”
and is intended to place drug addicts into treatment without letting
violent users go free. 167 However, the law mandates five eligibility
requirements that narrow the scope of the program. 168 First,
defendants may not have any violent history on their records.169
Second, a defendant will be disqualified if he or she is convicted of an
unrelated misdemeanor or a felony in the same proceeding. 170 Third,
any defendant in use or possession of a firearm while under the
influence of drugs is ineligible. 171 Fourth, any defendant who refuses
drug treatment as a condition of probation is ineligible. 172 Last, any
defendant who is “unamenable” to available forms of treatment will
not be eligible for the program. 173 These criteria allows prosecutors to
exclude nearly anyone from receiving a diversion program by
emphasizing certain facts about a defendant. 174
Ultimately, prosecutors have the power to effect change.
Prosecutorial discretion plays a huge role in what “justice” is and how
that justice is administered. Clear evidence of this can be seen in the
Graham case; the assigned prosecutor could have opted to try Graham
Vitiello, supra note 49 at 463.
Gregory A. Forest, Proposition 36 Eligibility: Are Courts and Prosecutors Following or
Frustrating The Will of Voters?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 628 (2005).
166 Id. at 629.
167 Id. at 628.
168 Id. at 631.
169 Id.
170 Id. Unrelated meaning: not related to the present drug charge.
171 Forest, supra note 165 at 632.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 632.
174 Id. at 641. In one small county the District Attorney acknowledged that he could prevent
every defendant charged with drug possession from qualifying for Proposition 36 by charging
an additional misdemeanor offense.
164
165
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as a minor and avoid three strikes altogether. Further, in implementing
Proposition 36 in California, prosecutor cooperation is essential for the
law to work as intended. The uneven application of Proposition 36
requires its revision or some form of punishment for prosecutors who
purposefully evade the law. A fining system could be instituted so that
prosecutors have greater incentives to act ethically. 175 Continuing
Legal Education programs can also be vital tools in instructing
prosecutors about the realities behind an LWOP sentence and the
proper use of discretion to guide defendants down the path of
rehabilitation.
Arguments that have been made in favor of Proposition 36
include the following: (1) drug abuse is medically treatable; (2)
incarcerating nonviolent drug offenders is wasteful; and (3)
community safety is best served by diverting drug offenders out of
incarceration and into treatment. 176 The greatest obstacle holding this
country back from reform is the general misunderstanding regarding
addiction. Until and unless drug addiction is widely understood as a
disease of the brain, which alters problem-solving and rational
thinking, our country will continue to criminalize this illness.
V.

CONCLUSION

While addicts should not be excused because of their
inculpable mental states, nor should we take pity on the outcomes of
addicted individuals’ cases; our system must acknowledge that
America has an addiction epidemic. Further, we must collectively
accept that our criminal justice system does nothing but fuel the fire of
addiction instead of placing rehabilitation at the forefront. To succeed,
we must shift our focus to dampening the demand for drugs instead of
stemming the supply. In order to do this, three changes must be
implemented at the federal level. First, a new system of review for
LWOP cases must be created. Second, Three Strike Rules must be
abolished, or at a minimum, reformed across the country. Third, more
rehabilitative options must become readily available and prosecutors
must be reminded of their moral obligation to seek appropriate justice
on a case by case basis. If these changes are implemented, there is

175 To date, no fining systems exist to ensure prosecutors uphold their moral and ethical
responsibilities. Disciplinary action against an individual attorney is the sole course of action.
176 Forest, supra note 165, at 634.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [2020], Art. 7

1254

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

hope for a United States where nonviolent addicts no longer serve life
behind prison bars.
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